UN-Iran Watch

TIMELINE

• JUNE 6, 2003: IAEA Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General
• APRIL 2004: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
• JULY 2004: IAEA 2003 Annual Report, page 7
• APRIL 2005: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
• SEPTEMBER 17, 2005: Iran's Response
> September 26, 2005: Editor's Commentary, "Impotent IAEA," National Review
• OCTOBER 7, 2005: Announcement: The Nobel Peace Prize 2005 awarded jointly to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, "for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way."
  > October 7, 2005: Editor's Commentary on decision to award Nobel Peace Prize to the IAEA and Mohamed ElBaradei, "Neville Chamberlain Would be Proud"
• NOVEMBER 24, 2005: IAEA response
• FEBRUARY 4, 2006: IAEA Board of Governors resolution
• MARCH 8, 2006: Report of the Director-General of the IAEA sent to Security Council
• MARCH 29, 2006: The Security Council finally became seized of the matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions and issues a Presidential Statement.
• APRIL 2006: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
• JULY 31, 2006: The Security Council adopted a resolution under the UN Charter Chapter VII, connecting Iranian misdeeds to a threat to international peace and security. But the only action the Council could muster was another time extension and report due in August 2006.
• AUGUST 31, 2006: The IAEA reported Iran's continued non-compliance.
> October 31, 2006: Editor's Commentary, "UN Leads World Towards Nuclear War", Washington Times
> October 31, 2006: Editor's Commentary, "Iran, Genocide and the UN", National Review Online
• DECEMBER 23, 2006: Sanctions Resolution The Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 under Article 41 of UN Charter Chapter VII. In order to gain Chinese and Russian votes, the sanctions scheme gutted earlier European and American drafts. The resolution gave Iran this ultimatum for continued non-compliance of UN pronouncements and resolutions about Iran's nuclear program: "further decisions will be required." The resolution states:
  "(2.) Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities: (a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA;"
  > December 2006: Editor's Commentary, Buying Russian and Chinese Votes
  > January 30, 2007: Editor's Commentary, "Genocide Awaits Us: The U.N. and Iran", National Review Online
• MARCH 24, 2007: Sanctions Resolution The Security Council adopted Resolution 1747 under Article 41 of UN Charter Chapter VII. It: (a) introduces an Israel diversion in the form of a reference to "a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction," (b) fails to adopt a mandatory travel ban and instead merely "calls upon all states to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit" of a limited list of individuals, (c) refuses to ban items and technology and instead merely "calls upon all states to exercise vigilance and restraint in the "supply" of these items, and (d) fails to impose a mandatory asset freeze but instead "calls upon all states and international financial institutions not to enter new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to...Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes." In its one "shall not" it bans only the country's arms exports - refusing to impose an arms embargo prohibiting the sale of weapons to Iran. The resolution also states:
"(6.) Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals ... missiles or missile systems... to Iran...
(13.) Affirms... (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA..."
> March 2007: Editor's Commentary, Buying Council Unanimity
• APRIL 2007: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
  > June 4, 2007: Editor's Commentary, "Prague Diary I", National Review Online
  > June 8, 2007: Editor's Commentary, "Prague Marching Orders", National Review Online
• MARCH 3, 2008: Sanctions Resolution The Security Council adopted Resolution 1803 under Article 41 of UN Charter Chapter VII. Security Council Resolution 1803 (a) Repeats previous resolutions' Israel diversions in the form of a reference to "a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction," (b) Imposes a so-called travel ban except when "the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified..." (c) Fails to impose a mandatory asset freeze or trade restrictions but instead "Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance..." (d) Neglects to isolate Iranian banks but instead "Calls upon all states to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran..." The resolution also states:
  "(1).... affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006),...
  (15.) Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts... as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;"
  > March 2008: Editor's Commentary, Buying Council Votes
• APRIL 2008: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism
  > May 21, 2008: Editor's Commentary, "Tiny Iran: Obama's Big Learning Curve", National Review Online
• SEPTEMBER 27, 2008: The Security Council adopted Resolution 1835 on the Iranian nuclear issue which does not add any sanctions to those in the previous resolutions.
• APRIL 2009: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
  > August 3, 2009: Editor's Commentary, "Obama to allow Iran to acquire nuclear arms", National Review Online
  > December 3, 2009: Editor's Commentary, "The Iran Timeline", National Review Online
  > February 22, 2010: Editor's Commentary, "What the IAEA Knew: The U.N. Agency Charged with Stopping Nuclear Proliferation Enabled it", Forbes.com
• APRIL 2010: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
  > May 4, 2010: Editor's Commentary, "How Obama enables Iran's defiance", New York Daily News
• JUNE 9, 2010: Sanctions Resolution The Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 on the Iranian nuclear issue under Article 41 of UN Charter Chapter VII. The text includes a loophole that would exempt a 2005 Russian deal, valued at hundreds of millions of dollars, to sell Tehran five S-300 surface-to-air missile systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and aircraft. The resolution also states:
  "(2.)...affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);
  (7.) Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving... technology-related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapon...
  (8.) Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran... of any... missiles or missile systems...
  (9.) Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;
  (37.) Affirms... (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA..."
  > September 24, 2010 Editor's Commentary, "Ahmadinejad Slams Shut Obama's 'Open Door' of Engagement, Again", National Review Online
  > February 1, 2011: Editor's Commentary, The Dangerous Mohammed ElBaradei
  > March 21, 2011: Editor's Commentary, "U.N. Iran Human Rights Investigation Is Too Late ... Again", Fox News
• APRIL 2011: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
• JUNE 9, 2011: The Security Council adopted Resolution 1984 on the Iranian nuclear issue which does not add any sanctions to those in the previous resolutions.
• NOVEMBER 8, 2011: The IAEA produced a Report finally admitting "Iran has carried out... activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device." It was more than 8 years after the organization begrudgingly admitted that Tehran had failed to comply with its NPT obligations. The Report states:
  "43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
  • Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
  • Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
  • The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
  • Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).
  44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others arespecific to nuclear weapons.
  45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing."
• APRIL 2012: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
• JUNE 7, 2012: The Security Council adopted Resolution 2049 on the Iranian nuclear issue which does not add any sanctions to those in the previous resolutions.
• AUGUST 30, 2012: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• NOVEMBER 16, 2012: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• FEBRUARY 21, 2013: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• APRIL 2013: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
  > May 13, 2013: Editor's Commentary, "Iranians Employ Thuggish Tactics at U.N. Human Rights Council", National Review Online
• MAY 22, 2013: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• JUNE 5, 2013: The Security Council adopted Resolution 2105 on the Iranian nuclear issue which does not add any sanctions to those in the previous resolutions.
• AUGUST 28, 2013: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
  > September 18, 2013: Editor's Commentary, "Iran's Rouhani and Obama at UN -- US Credibility From Bad to Worse", Fox News

  > September 25, 2013: Editor's Commentary, "At UN Rouhani Gives Obama Cover to Delay - The Invisible Handshake", Fox News
  > October 1, 2013: Editor's Commentary, "Netanyahu sounds alarm about Iran in UN speech -- but will Obama listen?", Fox News

• NOVEMBER 14, 2013: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• NOVEMBER 24, 2013: China, France, Russia, the UK, the US plus Germany (P5 + 1) and Iran agreed on the "Joint Plan of Action," a watershed that was the first formal agreement between the United States and Iran in 34 years. (The interim agreement led to an April 2015 framework agreement and a July 2015 final agreement.) Contrary to all of the UN Security Council sanctions resolutions on Iran, the agreement specifically permits Iran to enrich uranium.
• JANUARY 17, 2014 and JANUARY 20, 2014: The IAEA issued two reports concerning the implementation of a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed to by China, France, Germany, Russia, U.K., USA (the E3+3) and Iran.
• FEBRUARY 20, 2014: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• APRIL 2014: The State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
• MAY 23, 2014: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• JUNE 9, 2014: The Security Council adopted Resolution 2159 on the Iranian nuclear issue which does not add any sanctions to those in the previous resolutions.
• SEPTEMBER 5, 2014: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• NOVEMBER 3, 2014: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano told the UN General Assembly: "we are unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Agency therefore cannot conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• NOVEMBER 7, 2014: The IAEA issued another report, which provides: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities." The IAEA also determined "Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium gas has grown by 8 percent to nearly 8.4 tonnes in about two months" (Nov. 8, 2014, Frederick Dahl, Reuters).
• DECEMBER 3, 2014: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• FEBRUARY 19, 2015: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
• APRIL 2, 2015: Mindful of a timetable that introduced (possible) US Congressional oversight of an Iran deal, China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, Germany, the EU, and Iran reached a "framework agreement." Contrary to all of the UN Security Council sanctions resolutions on Iran, the agreement gives Iran a right to enrich uranium.
• MAY 29, 2015: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities." The report also states:
  
  "The Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. [GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section B] The Agency has obtained more information since November 2011 that has further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex."
• JUNE 9, 2015: The Security Council adopted Resolution 2224 on the Iranian nuclear issue which does not add any sanctions to those in the previous resolutions.
• JULY 11, 2015: Iran and the IAEA signed a secret side-deal, Separate Arrangement II Agreed by the Islamic State of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency on 11 July 2015, Regarding the Road-map, Paragraph 5 leaked by the Associated Press. The side deal leaves the collection of the data (like environmental samples) which might incriminate Iran, up to Iran itself and Iranian equipment. The IAEA Director-General and deputy on safeguards are only allowed to show up for a "courtesy" call.
• JULY 14, 2015: Iran and the IAEA signed a "Road-map for the Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program", which requires Iran to "address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex [entitled "Possible Military Dimensions to Iran's Nuclear Programme"] of the 2011 Director's General report." The Road Map states:
  
  "Iran and the Agency agreed on the following sequential arrangement with regard to the Parchin [a military complex] issue:
  1. Iran will provide to the Agency photos of the locations, including those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
  2. Iran will provide to the Agency videos of the locations, including those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
  3. Iran will provide to the Agency 7 environmental samples taken from points inside one building already identified by the Agency and agreed by Iran, and 2 points outside of the Parchin complex which would be agreed between Iran and the Agency.
  4. The Agency will ensure the technical authenticity of the activities referred to in paragraphs 1-3 above. Activities will be carried out using Iran's authenticated equipment, consistent with technical specifications provided by the Agency, and the Agency's containers and seals.
  5. The above mentioned measures would be followed, as a courtesy by Iran, by a public visit of the Director General, as a dignitary guest of the Government of Iran, accompanied by his deputy for safeguards.
  6. Iran and the Agency will organize a one-day technical roundtable on issues relevant to Parchin."
• JULY 14, 2015: China, France, Germany, Russia, U.K., USA and Iran agreed upon a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The deal grants Iran a right to enrich uranium. The JCPOA states:
  "NUCLEAR:
  A. (1.) Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities...
  (2.) ....Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz...
  (3.) Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D...
  (5.)...Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities...
  (14.) Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
  SANCTIONS:
  (18.) The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015)....
  (19) The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions...
  (21) The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II...
  ANNEX I - NUCLEAR-RELATED MEASURES...F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY:
  (27) Iran will keep its enrichment capacity...
  ANNEX V - IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
  ...(14.) Implementation Day will occur upon the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in paragraph 15 below...
  (15.) Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I..."
  > July 16, 2015: Editor's Commentary, "Obama Dashes to the United Nations, Circumvents Congress, on Iran Deal", The Weekly Standard
• JULY 20, 2015: Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 incorporating the JCPOA. The resolution grants Iran the right to enrich uranium, and terminates all four sanctions resolutions, despite the fact that Iran had refused to comply with all previous UN Security Council resolutions. The resolution states:
  "7. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5: (a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated;..."
  The resolution also introduces a non-nuclear dimension and changes Security Council prohibitions (that had been violated by Iran) on missile development. Instead, the resolution approves of Iran's ballistic missile development, commencing at the very latest in eight years. The resolution states:
  "ANNEX B: (3) Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day [October 18, 2015] or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier."
  > July 22, 2015: Editor's Commentary, Obama's Huge Iran Hostage Sellout: The Administration Gives A Pathetic Performance At The UN", New York Daily News
  > July 31, 2015: Editor's Commentary, "Huckabee Is Right: Iran Nuclear Deal Brings Us Closer to Catastrophe Of Holocaust Proportions", Breitbart News
  > September 8, 2015: Editor's Commentary, "Iran Deal: Why Won't Obama Reveal Terms and Conditions as Congress Gets Ready to Vote?", Fox News
• NOVEMBER 18, 2015: The IAEA issued another report, which states: "...the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities." The IAEA also determined that "Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium has increased in the past three months even though Tehran is supposed to reduce it significantly under a deal with major powers" (Nov. 18, 2015, Reuters and Armin Rosen, Business Insider). In the words of the report:
  "23... Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities 16 141.6 kg (+490.2 kg since the Director General's previous report) of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235, of which 8305.6 kg (+460.2 kg since the Director General's previous report) remain in the form of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235...."
• DECEMBER 2, 2015: the UN Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued its final report required under the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). In its report entitled "Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme" the IAEA finds that Iran
  1) engaged in "clandestine" procurements for its nuclear fuel cycle activities, (paras 25, 26, 35)
  2) has been and continues to be dishonest about multiple dimensions of its past nuclear program, (paras 22, 23, 27, 34, 37, 61)
  3) engaged in a cover-up of its activities at the Parchin military complex, (paras 57, 80)
  4) denied the Agency requested access to one of three workshops for designing a missile delivery vehicle after claiming that it was "no longer in business," (a request made as part of the probe mandated by the nuclear deal itself), ( paras 70, 71, 72) and
  5) had indeed engaged in "activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device..." (paras 85, 87)
  The report, therefore, has two main conclusions. First, "The Agency's overall assessment is that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003..." (para 87) Second, "the Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009" (para 87) – with the caveat that its "overall assessment" is "based on all the information available to the Agency."
  
  Key Excerpts of the "Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme"
  
  Conclusion: The absence of complete information (due directly to Iran's non-cooperation and clandestine behavior) means the IAEA is unable to establish a baseline for knowing how close Iran is to the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device. The Iranian nuclear deal (the JCPOA) - and its massive sanctions relief - will go into effect without the facts necessary to guarantee there will be no Iranian nuclear weapon.
  
  
• DECEMBER 7, 2015: China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K. and the USA submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors "with a view to closing" "all past and present outstanding issues" on Iran's nuclear program. (JCPOA, para. 14)
  
• DECEMBER 15, 2015: The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution closing its investigation on Iran's past nuclear activities. (Roadmap, para. 8)
  The resolution states:
  
  8. Notes the report of the Director General to the Board of Governors contained in GOV/2015/68, which, in line with the Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, includes the final assessment of all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the Director General's report in November 2011 contained in GOV/2011/65;
  9. Also notes that all the activities in the Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule and further notes that this closes the Board's consideration of this item;"
• JANUARY 7, 2016: Iran submitted a letter to the IAEA disputing the IAEA's December 2015 "Final Assessment" and its conclusion that "a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran." Instead, Iran continued to lie and repeated the claim - disproven by the IAEA - that "Iran's nuclear programme has always been and will remain for peaceful purposes..." Iran suggested it had been a victim of fraud and forged documents were responsible for the IAEA's conclusions.
  
  
• IMPLEMENTATION DAY: Implementation Day was set to occur upon the completion of certain steps by the IAEA, the EU, the United States, and the UN Security Council, that are to occur "simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V..."(JCPOA, para. 34 iii)
  
  What is required by the four actors is as follows:
  
  • The IAEA must submit a report "verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V..."
    
    "Annex V
    15.1. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor";
    15.2. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on "Heavy Water Production Plant";
    15.3. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on "Enrichment Capacity";
    15.4. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on "Centrifuges Research and Development";
    15.5. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant";
    15.6. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on "Other Aspects of Enrichment";
    15.7. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on "Uranium Stocks and Fuels";
    15.8. Paragraph 62 from Section K on "Centrifuge Manufacturing";
    15.9. Complete the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements to allow the IAEA to implement all transparency measures provided for in Annex I;
    15.10. Paragraphs 64 and 65 from Section L on "Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1";
    15.11. Paragraphs 80.1 and 80.2 from Section R on "Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency"; and
    15.12. Within one year from Implementation Day, Iran will have completed the measures specified in paragraphs 47.2 and 48.2 of Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant"..."
  • The EU must:
    
    "Annex V
    16.1. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 [issuing sanctions against Iran] and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.1- 1.1.3; 1.1.5 - 1.1.8; 1.2.1 - 1.2.5; 1.3.1, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 16 and 17 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP) and 1.3.3; 1.4.1 and 1.4.2; 1.10.1.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 39, 43, 43a of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012) of Annex II. EU Member States will terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required.
    16.2. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.6.1 - 1.7.2 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.
    16.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II of this JCPOA from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012. Suspend the provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Section 1.9.1 of Annex II in relation to individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II.
    16.4. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 of Annex II to implement the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolution referred to above...
    Annex II
    A. 1. The EU and EU Member States commit to terminate all provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (as subsequently amended) implementing all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, to terminate all provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended), as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, and to terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required, in accordance with Annex V..."
  • The United States must:
    
    "Annex V
    17.1. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1 - 4.5 and 4.7 of Annex II, with the exception of Section 211(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA);
    17.2. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
    17.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List), and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II;
    17.4. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645 and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 as set forth in Section 4 of Annex II; and
    17.5. License activities as set forth in Section 5 of Annex II...
    Annex II
    B. United States
    4. The United States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related sanctions as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below, and to terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance with Annex V..."
    
  • The UN Security Council must:
    
    "Annex V
    18.1. In accordance with the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the provisions imposed in UN Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) will be terminated subject to re-imposition in the event of significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments, and specific restrictions, including restrictions regarding the transfer of proliferation sensitive goods will apply..."
  • JANUARY 16, 2016: Became "Implementation Day."
    The Director General of the IAEA released a report to the IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council and issued a public statement "confirming that Iran has completed the necessary preparatory steps to start the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action... Agency inspectors on the ground verified that Iran has carried out all measures required under the JCPOA to enable Implementation Day to occur. "
    U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the United States would now remove its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran: "The U.S. sanctions-related commitments described in Sections 17.1-17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA are now in effect." In additional remarks, Kerry stated: "We welcome that Iran has followed through on the promises that it made. It has kept its word...today marks the first day of a safer world..."
    The EU and the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif issued a joint statement, which says: "Today, we have reached Implementation Day...As Iran has fulfilled its commitments, today, multilateral and national economic and financial sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme are lifted in accordance with the JCPOA...UN sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme are lifted. United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the JCPOA, will from now onwards, together with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), be the sole international legal framework related to Iran's nuclear activities, terminating provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2007), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015). The EU has confirmed that the legal framework providing for the lifting of its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions is effective..."
  • MAY 8, 2018: President Donald Trump announced that he was terminating the United States' participation in the JCPOA.
    President Trump issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and other government officials instructing them to restore sanctions on Iran that had been lifted under the JCPOA and to take additional steps to counter Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and threats to regional stability.
  • AUGUST 20, 2020: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo notified the Security Council that the United States was invoking the "snap-back" provisions of the JCPOA to reinstate various sanctions on Iran for violating multiple JCPOA provisions.