



PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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STATEMENT

BY

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TO THE UNITED NATIONS

DURING THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ON

THE CO-CHAIRS PAPER
"THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM
STRATEGY"

New York,
14 June 2006

Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, during the Informal Consultations of the General Assembly on the Co-Chairs Paper "The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy", 14 June, 2006

Mr. Co-Chairman,

I thank the Co-Chairs for the preparation of the draft elements for a "UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy".

2. We understand that it, in some ways, is compilation text which reflects the views and suggestions offered by delegations in the informal discussions held earlier on the Secretary-General's Report.

3. We respect and appreciate the effort made by the two Co-Chairs to find "common ground" in the document. In this context, I have two comments:

One, common ground can be found only once the legitimacy of the opposing viewpoints is acknowledged and reflected in the negotiating process. The draft elements, unfortunately, do not – at least explicitly – reflect the priorities and proposal of certain delegations, including my country and some other OIC countries, on important issues e.g. the definition of terrorism; the need to address underlying causes, such as foreign occupation and the suppression of self-determination; the issue of "state terrorism"; the problem of insults and defamation of religions and cultures; the need for vigorous international efforts to promote socio-economic development and employment-creation to end extremism and terrorism. If agreement is to be reached on the comprehensive strategy, these and other difficult issues will have to be addressed and agreed approaches evolved.

Two, common ground is likely to be evolved not through ambiguous phraseology or avoidance of "problem" issues through euphemisms. They can be resolved only in an open and honest negotiating process. This negotiating process cannot be short-circuited by the repeated and deliberate omission of the difficult issues in the documents prepared for the consideration of member States.

4. **Second**, even though the draft elements omit or avoid some difficult issues, the document produced is, obviously, too long and too detailed to serve as a "strategy". Its focus is, like the Secretary-General's report, on operational details, rather than the normative and political issues on which agreement is required for a "strategy" to provide value-addition to the current efforts of the international community to combat terrorism.

5. **Third**, the structure of the document is somewhat confusing and perhaps inadequate. Sections on an "introduction" and "guiding principles" are obviously a good beginning. But, the division of the rest of the document into the 3 Sections on "Measures" to (i) address "conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (ii) prevent and combat terrorism; and (iii) ensure respect for human rights, are too broad. Each of the three sections includes "operational" and "policy measures" which are, in part at least, overlapping and potentially contradictory.

6. **Fourth**, the provisions included under each part of the document are also arbitrarily placed. Some of the provisions in the introduction could well be included as “general principles”. Some of the “general principles” could be included in the introduction and/or in one of the other 3 sections of the document. Also, operational and policy measures are not always distinguishable from each other and often amount to “exhortation” only (e.g. to encourage; invite etc.)

7. **Fifth**, the draft elements – like the Secretary-General’s report – are nicely focused on action within the UN. In our view, the purpose and value of the exercise is to evolve a global strategy for agreed, coherent and effective action by Member States; not only to promote coherence among the proliferating activities of UN bureaucracies on terrorism.

8. **Sixth**, several of the words concepts, actions offered in the draft elements – as also in the Secretary-General’s Report – need clarification, legally and politically. For instance, there is no clarity on what constitutes “instigation” of terrorism; “sanctuaries” for terrorists; “victims of terrorism”. Some other words are loosely used e.g. “soft targets”; internationally shared values”.

9. **Seventh**, the draft elements in several paragraphs want to “take note” of the “intention” of the Secretary-General to take certain actions e.g. to institutionalize the Counter-Terrorism Task Force. While we do not necessarily disagree with the intended action, surely such actions need to be approved by Member States, especially where they require the expenditure of additional resources.

10. In my intervention in the earlier consultations, and in bilateral contexts with you, Co-Chairs, we had suggested that a possibly useful structure of the strategy document could be to group its provisions into 3 time-frames for realization: short, medium and long-term. We continue to believe that such a structure could better capture all the elements of a comprehensive strategy and also enable us to reach agreement on ways to address some of the difficult or problem issues I have mentioned earlier.

11. In order to further illustrate this approach, my delegation has prepared an outline of a possible strategy document, which I am circulating with this statement. Our outline includes **first**: an introduction, which records the background of our endeavour to evolve a strategy; **second**, sets out the objectives of a comprehensive strategy; **third**, lists the “general principles” for the strategy; **fourth**, sets out “Short-Term, Medium-Term and Long-Term Measures, which include both operational, normative and policy issues that could be achieved within the three time-frames. Finally, it includes a section on International Measures, both at the Secretariat and inter-governmental levels.

12. I wish to emphasize that this is only a broad outline. But, we believe it offers an idea of how we could differentiate the different issues in a clear and coherent manner in a comprehensive strategy. The three timeframes will, we believe, also enable us to address all issues, including the difficult issues, by reflecting the degree of agreement that exists on each and providing for processes designed to evolve full agreement on these issues. It is only thus that we can hope to evolve a strategy that is comprehensive and which can evoke the support of the widest possible majority of Member States.

Pakistan
Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy
-An Outline

I. **Introduction**

- (1). Terrorism is a threat to peace and security, economic and social development and prosperity, to the stability of States and promotion and respect for human rights.
- (2). Terrorism is a global phenomenon with both local and global challenges.
- (3). 2005 Summit has condemned Terrorism “.. in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes”.
- (4). The international community has adopted legal and operational measures to combat terrorism. These, inter alia, include the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions, 13 International Conventions and the additional protocols, and operational steps; including establishment of counter-terrorism mechanism with in the UN system; intelligence sharing among the member states; arrests of terrorists; the financial curbs and initiatives for promotion of inter-faith harmony.
- (5). The 2005 Summit recognized the need to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy “to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses at the national, regional and international levels to counter terrorism”. This is essential to ensure sustained and complete success in countering and eliminating terrorism.

II **Objectives of a Comprehensive Strategy**

The objective of a comprehensive strategy is:

- (1). To make our world safe from terrorist violence.
- (2). To eliminate the underlying conditions which give rise to terrorism.
- (3). To strengthen the legal measures to counter terrorism.
- (4). To promote full international cooperation in all relevant fields to counter and eliminate terrorism.
- (6) To strengthen the capacity of the UN to assist states in combating terrorism and to enhance the coordination of the United Nation activates in this regard.

III. **General Principles for the Strategy**

- (1). The Strategy must seek to counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
- (2). It should promote international cooperation, especially through inclusive, transparent and accountable processes.
- (3). It should enhance the capacity of Member States to undertake the operational and other policy measures required to counter and eliminate terrorism.
- (4). It should address the underlying causes – political, economic and social – which give rise to the phenomenon of terrorism.
- (5) It should promote the implementation of the international conventions and relevant international law to counter terrorism.
- (6). It should be consistent with the principles of the UN Charter - ensuring the sovereignty and sovereign equality of states and right of people to self determination- and international law, humanitarian law and universal human rights standards.

- (7). It should prevent the suppression of legitimate resistance against foreign occupation or for self-determination under the guise of cantering terrorism.
- (8). It should not discriminate against any religion or other group and promote tolerance and harmony among religions, cultures and civilizations.
- (9). It should encompass measures aimed at achieving short, medium and longer-term objectives.
- (10). It should include measures to promote operational action by and cooperation among States, measures to promote clear legal norms and standards, including a legal definition of terrorism; and measures to address the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism.

IV. **Short-Term Measures**

- (1). Operational Measures
 - a). Police measures;
 - b). Intelligence sharing;
 - c). Financial and monetary controls;
 - d). Organized crime;
 - e). Border controls; and
 - f). Building state capacity and expertise in counter-terrorism.
- (2). Implementation of existing legal conventions and norms including implementation of:
 - a) 13 international counter-terrorism conventions and the additional protocols.
 - b). Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540.

- c). Streamlining of procedures (e.g. listing and de-listing procedures of resolution 1267, reporting obligations etc.).

V Medium-Term Measures

- (1). Adoption of improved operational process in above fields.
- (2). Finalization of legal definition of terrorism.
- (3). Adoption, by consensus, of a comprehensive convention against terrorism.
- (4). Steps to enhance adoption and implementation of measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD capabilities, including through international treaties:
 - a). Nuclear Weapons (Export Controls, physical Controls and disarmament measures),
 - b). Chemical weapons (destruction of stocks, enhanced verification),
 - c). Biological weapons (adoption of an international BW Verification System).
- (5). Initiation of steps to address the conflict situations and political disputes (which give rise to terrorism or are exploited by terrorists), specially situations of foreign occupation, suppression of the right of peoples to self-determination (e.g. Palestine, Kashmir).

VI. Long-Term Measures

- (1). Resolution of major outstanding disputes (sub Para 5 of V).
- (2). Implementation of National Strategies to combat and eliminate extremism e.g. promotion of tolerance, eradication of economic marginalization and financial integration of societies.

- (3). Promotion of Religious Tolerance and harmony within and among States.
- (4). Dialogue among Religions, Cultures and Civilizations (promotion of related initiatives: Alliance of Civilizations; Enlightened Moderation etc.).
- (5). Adoption and implementation of global, regional and national measures to promote socio-economic growth and modernization (as a mean to preventing and eliminating extremism and terrorist recruitment).

VII **Institutional Measures**

- (1). Enhancing the capacity of the CTED.
- (2). A UN Secretariat Mechanism for coordination.
- (3). An international Centre on Counter Terrorism which could promote the adoption, implementation and monitoring of the short, medium and long term measures set out in the comprehensive strategy.
- (4). A General Assembly / intergovernmental oversight and policy mechanism.