Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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Excerpts from the report include:

“1…This assessment is based on all safeguards-relevant information available to the Agency…

22. …Iran had arranged, via a number of…management structures, for activities to be undertaken in support of a possible military dimension to its nuclear programme…Information indicated that…equipment and work places were either cleaned or disposed of so that there would be little to identify the sensitive nature of the work that had been undertaken...

23. In Iran’s submission of 15 August 2015 under the Road-map, Iran…denied the existence of a coordinated programme aimed at the development of a nuclear explosive device…

24. The Agency assesses that, before the end of 2003, an organizational structure was in place in Iran suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. …[S]ome activities took place after 2003…

25…Iran was able to make procurements, primarily for its nuclear fuel cycle activities…through…disguising the final user.

26. The Agency also had indications of instances of procurement and attempted procurements of items with relevance…to the development of a nuclear explosive device…

27. During discussions with the Agency on 16 September 2015 under the Road-map…Iran also reiterated its earlier denial…

29…Information…links the uranium salts to be produced with warhead development…

34. Information available to the Agency…indicated that Iran had made progress with preparatory work aimed at developing a chemical process to reduce a uranium fluoride compound (UF4) to uranium metal…[I]nformation indicated that Iran conducted preparatory work…for the fabrication of uranium components for a nuclear explosive device. During discussions in September 2015 under the Road-map, Iran informed the Agency that it had not conducted metallurgical work specifically designed for nuclear devices, and was not willing to discuss any similar activities that did not have such an application.

35. Based on all the information available to it, the Agency has found…

36. The development of safe, fast-acting detonators, and equipment suitable for firing the detonators, is an integral part of a programme to develop an implosion-type nuclear explosive device… the Agency had information indicating that Iran, in 2002-2003, developed exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators…

37. …The Agency notes that Iran has not provided an explanation for the activities the information indicates that it undertook during 2000-2003.

38. Iran stated that the rationale for developing EBW detonators was to help prevent explosive accidents…At the meeting under the Road-map on 15 October 2015, Iran provided the Agency with a table listing…six accidents. The Agency notes that …at least one did not appear to be related to a detonator.

…

40. The Agency assesses that EBW detonators developed by Iran have characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device…

46. The Agency assesses that the MPI technology developed by Iran has characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device…

57. The information available to the Agency, including the results of the sampling analysis and the satellite imagery, does not support Iran’s statements on the purpose of the building… The Agency assesses that the extensive activities undertaken by Iran since February 2012 at the particular location of interest to the Agency seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.

…

61. With reference to the modelling studies on high explosives, in its submission to the Agency of 15 August 2015 under the Road-map, Iran … stated that such applications were of no relevance to the Agency’s concern. During subsequent technical-expert meetings, Iran indicated that, in view of the strong conventional military dimensions associated with this work, it was not in a position to discuss them.

62. … [T]he Agency assesses that Iran conducted computer modelling of a nuclear explosive device prior to 2004 and between 2005 and 2009.

67… Iran was in possession of documentation identified as being relevant to explosive safety arrangements inherent to the testing of a nuclear explosive device.

68. The Agency has not received additional information on this area since the 2011 Annex.

…

70. In the course of Road-map implementation, Iran was requested by the Agency, inter alia, to arrange visits to the workshops identified by the Agency…

71. On 30 September 2015, the Agency was shown a short video by Iran of each of the three workshops… [T]he third was said to have been filmed from outside the workshop which was no longer in business. On 15 October 2015, the Agency was invited to visit the two operational workshops…

72. The Agency has verified the existence in Iran of two of the workshops…

…

**Overall Assessment**

77. Based on all the information available to the Agency…

78. Based on all the information available to it [the Agency]…

79. The Agency assesses that explosive bridgewire (EBW) detonators developed by Iran have characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device… The Agency also assesses that the multipoint initiation (MPI) technology developed by Iran has characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device…

80. … Iran made and installed a large cylinder at the Parchin military complex in 2000… [T]his cylinder matched the parameters of an explosives firing chamber… [T]he extensive activities undertaken by Iran since February 2012 at the particular location of interest to the Agency seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.

81… Iran conducted computer modelling of a nuclear explosive device prior to 2004 and between 2005 and 2009…

85. The Agency’s overall assessment is that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003…and some activities took place after 2003… The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of nuclear explosive device after 2009.